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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The field of law and socioeconomics studies the interrelationship 
between law and economic/social processes.  It not only critiques 
neoclassical economics, but draws on alternative economic approaches 
and the other social sciences, such as psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, and political science, for the tools of public policy 
 
 *  Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1975.  This Article is based on my presentations given at the Association of American Law Schools 2003 Annual Meeting, Law and Economics Session, and at the 25th Anniversary National Association of Women Judges 2003 Annual Conference, October 8, 2003, and on my article, Lynne L. Dallas, Law and Socioeconomics in Legal 
Education, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 855 (2003). 
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analysis.  It offers students an interdisciplinary, values-based approach 
to public policy that is designed to take into account the power 
implications and distributional effects of laws.  Law and socioeconomics 
stresses the importance to effective regulation of attention to historical 
context, philosophical beliefs, culture, existing institutions, working 
rules, and sources of power.  The alternative economic approaches that it 
encompasses include behavioral, neo-institutional, feminist, binary, neo-
Marxist, traditional institutional, and post-Keynesian economics.  These 
heterodox economic approaches are united in that they disagree with one 
or more aspects of neoclassical economics.1 
This Article, in Part II, gives a brief introduction to socioeconomics 
and its relevance to law.  Part III presents an overview of what a law and 
socioeconomics course may look like, based on materials in my textbook, 
Law and Public Policy: A Socioeconomic Approach.2  Part IV presents in 
more detail exploration of materials included in a segment of the course. 
II.  AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOECONOMICS AND ITS                       
RELEVANCE TO LAW 
The legal academy has been mainly exposed to neoclassical 
economics.  Many teachers are not aware of the limitations of this 
approach or of alternative schools of economic thought (hereinafter 
referred to as socioeconomics) that criticize neoclassical economics and 
offer alternative perspectives.  I provide a brief introduction to law and 
 
 1. For discussions of the meaning of socioeconomics, see ROBERT A. SOLO, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS v–vii (2000);  Richard M. Coughlin, 
Introduction: Toward an Agenda for Socio-Economics, in MORALITY, RATIONALITY, AND EFFICIENCY: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIO-ECONOMICS 3, 4–5 (Richard M. Coughlin ed., 1991); Richard M. Coughlin, Whose Morality?  Which Community?  What Interests?  Socio-
Economics and Communitarian Perspectives, 25 J. SOCIO-ECON. 135, 136–37 (1996); Amitai Etzioni, Socio-Economics: A Budding Challenge, in SOCIO-ECONOMICS: TOWARD 
A NEW SYNTHESIS 3, 4 (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1991); Richard Hattwick, The Future Paradigm for Socio-Economics: Three Visions and a Call for 
Papers, 28 J. SOCIO-ECON. 511, 511 (1999); Paul C. Stern, The Socio-Economic 
Perspective and Its Institutional Prospects, 22 J. SOCIO-ECON. 1, 1 (1993); Charles J. Whalen, Preface to POLITICAL ECONOMY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWS ON THE TREND OF ECONOMICS xv, xv (Charles J. Whalen ed., 1996).  For discussions of law and socioeconomics, see LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH (forthcoming Spring 2004); Robert Ashford, Socio-
Economics: What Is Its Place in Law Practice?, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 611, 611, 614–15; Robert Ashford, The Socio-Economic Foundation of Corporate Law and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (2002); Lynne L. Dallas, Law and 
Socioeconomics in Legal Education, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 855, 855–57 (2003); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Law and Socioeconomics, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 224, 224–25 (1999); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Teaching Contracts from a Socioeconomic Perspective, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1233, 1233–36 (2000).  2. DALLAS, supra note 1.  This textbook is forthcoming from the Carolina Academic Press in Spring 2004. 
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socioeconomics, in this Part, by considering concepts used by neoclassical 
economists and socioeconomists and their relevance to law. 
A.  Conceptions of Markets 
From the socioeconomic perspective, markets are “social construction.”3 
“Consumption, production and distribution of income [are] determined 
in [the] context of legal/institutional environment, social norms, customs 
and rules, market power, corporate power, bargaining power, class, race, 
gender, and other forms of discrimination.”4  From the neoclassical 
perspective, markets are “natural” and “private.”5  “Persons exercising 
individual choice determine consumption, production and distribution of 
income.”6 
What is the relevance of these concepts for the role of law?  Reliance 
is often placed on the self-regulatory nature of markets when markets are 
perceived as natural and private.  In addition, for the autonomous and 
self-sufficient actors exercising free choice in these markets, law is 
designed to ensure the enforcement of contracts and possibly to regulate 
fraud.7 
In contrast, when markets are social constructions, the role of law is 
broadened.8  The law may seek to influence social norms, for example.  
This role refers to the expressive function of law, where law is designed 
not only to affect incentives based on rational cost-benefit analyses, but 
to influence the very values that persons internalize in making choices.9  
Understanding markets and choice as embedded in a social milieu also 
emphasizes the interdependence of economic actors and how the 
behavior and choices of some people affect the opportunity sets of 
others.10  If actors are interdependent, the law’s role becomes to manage 
relationships to assure fairness in terms of the opportunities available to 
various actors and the distribution of entitlements.  For example, the law 
may prohibit discrimination on the basis of invidious distinctions, such 
as race, gender, and sexual orientation. 
 
 3. Dallas, supra note 1, at 858. 
 4. Id. at 891. 
 5. Id. at 890. 
 6. Id. at 891. 
 7. Id. at 859. 
 8. Id. at 859–60. 
 9. Id. at 864. 
 10. Id. at 858. 
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B.  Conceptions of Economics as a Discipline 
To law and socioeconomic scholars, economics is a study of 
“provisioning,” that is, “how societies provide for the well-being of their 
members.”11  It is a study of economics in relation to culture and history 
and is process-oriented and evolutionary.12  The economy is viewed as 
the result of “a complex historical process that is ever evolving and 
whose future is influenced by the past although not wholly determined 
by it.”13  In contrast, neoclassical economists understand economics to 
be a “[t]heory of choice and how scarce resources are allocated to satisfy 
unlimited human wants.”14  They use a  timeless microeconomic model 
to make their predictions.15 
To understand the differences, consider the neoclassical economic 
model, which predicts that wages result from the intersection of labor 
demand and supply curves and reflect the marginal productivity of 
individuals or, according to the statistical discrimination theory, the 
marginal productivity of groups.16  In contrast, socioeconomists claim 
that wage discrimination does not necessarily reflect productivity 
differences, but rests on historical legacies and culture that result in 
differential assessments of worth, often based on stereotyping.17  
Supportive of this view is the failure of human capital theory to explain 
away economic discrimination based on productivity differences.18  In 
addition, socioeconomists claim that wage discrimination is, in some 
cases, based on fairness considerations.19  This observation explains, for 
example, inter-industry wage differentials for similar jobs.20  The 
different economic approaches to economics as a discipline support 
different legal prescriptions. 
Consider another example of the different approaches to economics as 
a discipline in the context of market reform in Russia.  Based on the insights 
of neoclassical economists, the Washington Consensus developed to 
advise “shock therapy,” which refers to the rapid liberalization of 
markets in Russia and the privatization of enterprises.21  This advice was 
 
 11. Id. at 891.  12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  16. DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 7 (Discrimination), ch. 9 (Families, Markets and the Law). 
 17. Id. at ch. 7 (Discrimination). 
 18. Id. at ch. 7 (Discrimination), ch. 9 (Families, Markets and the Law). 
 19. Id. at ch. 9 (Families, Markets and the Law). 
 20. Id.  21. Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What 
Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1739 (2000); see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Whither 
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followed based on the predictions that new property owners would have 
incentives to maximize the value of their corporations and that the 
market would inflict economic discipline.  What transpired was very different, 
however, and confirmed the warnings of the evolutionary-institutional 
economic approach.22  There was wholesale looting of Russian enterprises 
with devastating consequences to the economy and the Russian people.  
Per capita gross domestic product declined by forty percent, persons in 
poverty grew from a fraction of the population to thirty-seven percent, 
and the average life span of the population declined.23  This was truly a 
story of human tragedy that was predicted by the evolutionary-institutional 
economic approach, but came as surprise to neoclassical economists who 
relied on their timeless model in a real world setting.24 
A final example of the different approaches to economics as a 
discipline involves a research project in which I was asked by a Slovene 
scholar to evaluate Slovenia’s recently-adopted employee codetermination 
system of corporate governance.  In this system, employees as well as 
shareholders elect directors to the supervisory board of a two-tiered 
board system.25  I did not adopt a one-size-fits-all model based on the 
theoretical arguments of neoclassical economic scholars who reject 
stakeholder theory and argue in favor of shareholder representation on 
corporate boards to achieve the “efficient” objective of maximizing 
profit and shareholder gain.26 
In contrast, I took an institutional-evolutionary economic approach.  I 
explored why employee codetermination had been adopted in Slovenia.  
What functions did it serve as Slovenia was emerging as a market 
economy?  I found a number of reasons why employee codetermination 
was effective in the historical context in which Slovenia found itself.  
For example, Slovenia was unique among Eastern European countries in 
having a history of employee self-management of state-owned 
 
Reform?  Ten Years of the Transition, Keynote Address at the World Bank Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (Apr. 28–30, 1999), available at http://www. worldbank.org/research/abcde/pdfs/stiglitz.pdf.  22. DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 12 (Emerging Market Economies).  23. Black et al., supra note 21, at 1780–81; John Peters et al., Economic Transition 
as a Crisis of Vision: Classical Versus Neoclassical Theories of General Equilibrium, 28 E. ECON. J. 217, 227 (2002). 
 24. Black et al., supra note 21, at 1733, 1767–77, 1797.  25. Lynne L. Dallas, The Evolutionary-Institutional Approach to Corporate Governance: The Case of Slovenia (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  26. DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 10 (Corporate Social Responsibility, Markets and the Law). 
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enterprises.27  Employee codetermination provided a mechanism to 
gradually introduce a governance system in which shareholders also 
played a part.  In addition, for Slovene corporations to become competitive, 
it was necessary for the employees to make sacrifices in terms of wages 
and benefits.28  Codetermination provided employees with some assurance 
that they would share in the future rewards that these sacrifices would 
entail.  Therefore, it was easier to institute these changes without undue 
discontent and adverse motivational effects.  It was also the case that 
many of the shares in Slovene corporations were to be owned by 
Slovene political entities and investment companies associated with 
political parties.29  In this context, employee representation provided a 
counterweight to the exercise of political authority within Slovene 
corporations.  Additionally, the two-tiered board structure, which provides 
for a separate management board, would serve to discourage political 
interference into the day-to-day management of the corporation.30  
Slovene corporations also did a substantial amount of trade with 
Germany and expected this trade to increase.31 They sought to make 
their corporations compatible with German corporations that have 
codetermination.32  Finally, emerging from communism, employee 
codetermination—rather than shareholder wealth maximization—was a 
system of corporate governance that Slovenians were prepared to accept 
based on the values that they held.33  In this research I was reminded of a 
statement by Philip Mirowski, an institutional economist, who explains 
that: 
[t]he economy is primarily a process of learning, negotiation, and coordination, and not a ratification of some pre-existent goals or end-state.  Economic rationality is socially and culturally determined. . . .  The economy itself may be conceptualized as the prosecution of inquiry by material means, with the community both constructing and discovering its values.34 
C.  Conceptions of Economic Actors 
Another area of difference between law and socioeconomics and law 
and neoclassical economics involves assumptions of human behavior.  
Neoclassical economics is based on assumptions that people are self-
 
 27. Dallas, supra note 25. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  34. Dallas, supra note 1, at 861 (quoting Philip Mirowski, The Philosophical Basis 
of Institutional Economics, in 1 EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 51, 69 (Marc R. Tool ed., 1988)). 
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interested and rational.35  Socioeconomists challenge these assumptions.36  
First, consider the self-interested assumption.  In my law and socioeconomics 
class I have students play the ultimatum game.  In this game:  
one student assumes the role of an allocator and decides what part of a dollar he or she is willing to offer to another student, the recipient.  The recipient may accept the offer, in which case both players receive the amounts allocated.  If the recipient rejects the offer, however, neither player receives anything.37   
Based on assumptions of the rational actor, neoclassical economists 
predict that recipients will accept any offer above zero.38  In reality, 
many recipients will accept only offers for higher amounts that they 
deem “fair.”39 
This finding concerning the importance of fairness is relevant to the 
law.  People are concerned about outcomes, but also about fairness.40  
When people are treated in a procedurally fair manner, they will accept 
adverse outcomes and comply with them more readily than people who 
perceive the procedure to be unfair.41  For example, a study of civil 
litigation in federal courts found that there was a strong relationship 
between litigants’ judgments of procedural fairness and their acceptance 
of arbitration awards.42  Moreover, judgments of procedural fairness 
were found to relate to the acceptance of the legitimacy of authorities, 
and these perceptions of legitimacy were related to greater legal 
compliance.43 
In addition to challenging the assumption of self-interest, the rationality 
assumption has also been challenged by law and socioeconomic scholars.44  
The law reviews now contain numerous articles that explore the 
significance to various areas of law of bounded rationality, cognitive 
biases, and heuristics.45  Illustrative are articles on discrimination, which 
 
 35. Dallas, supra note 1, at 862. 
 36. Id. at 864–68. 
 37. Id. at 864–65 (footnotes omitted).   
 38. Id. at 865. 
 39. Id.  40. DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 3 (Economic Fairness and Well-Being), ch. 4 (Fairness and Legal Socialization).  41. Id. at ch. 4 (Fairness and Legal Socialization) (citing Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 167–71 (1997)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  44. Dallas, supra note 1, at 866–68. 
 45. See DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 2 (Law and Cognitive Psychology) (exploring findings of cognitive psychology that suggest alternate legal rules and procedures). 
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point out the adverse effects of categorizing and stereotyping people by 
race, gender, and other social characteristics.  Cognitive psychologists 
explain findings relevant to the employment context: (1) persons 
disproportionately attribute ingroup members’ failures to situational or 
circumstantial factors and outgroup members’ failures to dispositional or 
character traits; (2) persons are better able to recall the undesirable 
behavior of outgroup members than the similar undesirable behavior of 
ingroup members; and (3) persons have a more negative reaction to the 
problematic behavior of a token or “solo” than to the problematic 
behavior of a person who is not a token.46  All of these biases affect 
employment and promotion decisions and are important for lawmakers 
to understand if they are concerned about discrimination. 
D.  Interpersonal Utility Comparisons and Conceptions                                
of Well-Being 
Law and neoclassical economic scholars will not make interpersonal 
utility comparisons.47  That is, a dollar is taken to mean the same to all 
persons.  A dollar used for food to survive is equivalent to a dollar used 
to buy diamonds.48  This position is contrary to that of economists in the 
past who believed in the declining utility of the dollar as a person’s 
wealth increased.49  In addition, many socioeconomists maintain the 
feasibility of ascertaining objective and universal needs.50  Institutional 
economist Geoffrey Hodgson claims that rational discourse is possible 
on the subject of human needs, given the human condition and context.51  
Moreover, feminist economist Paula England believes that persons are 
capable of empathy, which enables them to make interpersonal utility 
comparisons.52  To socioeconomists, social welfare analysis requires 
consideration of the extent to which human needs are satisfied.53  This 
analysis includes considerations of social and economic rights and 
distributional concerns. 
Law and socioeconomic scholars also consider both hedonic and 
eudaimonic well-being.54  That is, their focus is not simply on maximizing 
 
 46. DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 7 (Discrimination) (citing Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination 
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1192, 1194–95 (1995)).  47. Dallas, supra note 1, at 881. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 881–82. 
 50. Id. at 882. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 3 (Economic Fairness and Well-Being). 
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pleasure versus pain, but also on considering the psychological conditions 
necessary for psychological well-being and human actualization. 
E.  Approaches to Legal Regulation 
 Law and neoclassical economic scholars apply economics to seek  
“efficient” laws.  In some situations they recommend that markets should 
allocate property.  The popular version of the Coase Theorem, for example, 
provides that private parties acting in their own self-interest will allocate 
property through their contracts so that this property will be put to its 
most efficient use.55  However, if a market solution is not readily apparent, 
law and neoclassical economic scholars seek to have courts “mimic” the 
market.56  One such method is embraced by their hypothetical bargaining 
model.57  According to this method, courts must hypothesize bargaining 
among the parties and come up with a solution based on this hypothetical 
bargaining.  In addition, they recommend that choices of laws and public 
projects be based on cost-benefit analysis.58    The solutions reached by 
these methods are deemed to be “efficient.”59  Efficiency is understood 
as a state that maximizes social welfare and that is neutral or indifferent 
as to the distribution of wealth.60 
Law and socioeconomists question whether social welfare is maximized 
when there are great disparities in wealth.61  To law and neoclassical 
economists, there is no difference, from an efficiency perspective,  
whether ninety percent of the wealth is owned by ten percent of the 
population or by ninety percent of the population.62  This makes a difference 
to law and socioeconomists.  They are concerned with distribution.63  They 
ask the additional questions of efficient for whom and at what cost to 
others. 
Institutional economists also point out that prices are not neutral but 
rights specific.  That is, prices “reflect the property regime under which 
the commodities are produced and traded.”64  In other words, “laws that 
 
 55. Dallas, supra note 1, at 893. 
 56. Id. at 872.  57. DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 3 (Economic Fairness and Well-Being).  58. Dallas, supra note 1, at 884. 
 59. Id. at 876–77, 884. 
 60. Id. at 877, 879. 
 61. Id. at 878. 
 62. Id. at 877–78. 
 63. Id. at 878. 
 64. Id. 
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affect entitlements determine demand and supply curves, prices and 
costs.  Thus, ‘efficiency is a function of existing rights’ and it is ‘circular 
to maintain that efficiency alone can determine rights.’”65 Trading 
reflects the “normative distributive premises underlying the existing 
legal regime.”66  The recommendation of mimicking the market, therefore, 
begs the question of which market we are talking about.  There is not 
one market, but as many markets as different legal rules can create.  
Consider, for example, the problem used to describe the Coase Theorem 
with the court allocating property rights to the cattleman.  The price at 
which the farmer is willing to purchase the land from the cattleman and 
the cattleman is willing to accept is determined by a slew of regulations 
applicable to farming, grazing, and food products. 
The market mimicking solution is even more unhelpful when one 
takes into account the endowment effect.67  Behavioral economists have 
found that the price people are willing to pay if they do not own the 
property is less than the price that they are willing to accept for the 
property if they own it.68  Ownership matters then to the valuation of 
property. This behavioral finding further supports the conclusion that 
market trading or “efficiency” is dependent on existing entitlements. 
Cost-benefit analysis as a tool of public policy analysis suffers from 
the same problems of valuation.69  It is important to recognize the normative 
assumptions underlying prices and rules used in cost-benefit analysis.  
Cost-benefit analysis is not a neutral tool of public policy analysis, but 
necessarily makes value judgments.70 
Finally, the hypothetical bargaining model is also problematic.  As 
previously explained, it asks the court to determine what the parties 
would have bargained for if they could have foreseen the problem 
confronting the court.  DeMott captures the problems with this model.  
She states the following: 
[T]he “hypothetical bargain” view of fiduciary obligation does not help to explain the law.  For one thing, how hypothetical is the bargain?  If it is an approximation of something that particular parties would have agreed to, the content of the bargain will, like actual bargains, reflect many factors, including the scarcity of the subject matter of the bargain, the parties’ relative skills in negotiation, and their relative degrees of aversion to risks of varied sorts.  In the absence of an actual bargain, one cannot know the import of each of these factors.  On the other hand, if the “hypothetical bargain” represented by fiduciary obligation is truly hypothetical, and not an approximation of what 
 
 65. Id. (quoting NICOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 118 (1997)).   
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 868. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 885. 
 70. Id. at 885–87. 
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particular parties would have agreed to, why characterize it as a “bargain” at all?  In this respect, the metaphor of the hypothetical bargain is like the Wizard of Oz.  Behind the curtain is less than appearances might suggest.71 
F. The Invisible Hand of Adam Smith 
Finally, I will comment on the “invisible hand” of Adam Smith, which 
is at the heart of neoclassical market analysis.  Studies of the prisoners’ 
dilemma game show that persons pursuing their individual self-interest 
often obtain outcomes that are not in their self-interest.72  These findings 
are contrary to Adam Smith’s invisible hand, whereby individuals 
pursuing their self-interest are expected to unintendedly maximize social 
welfare.73 For example, the invisible hand of Adam Smith is the basis of 
neoclassical economic arguments in favor of trade liberalization.  While 
this complex topic is beyond the scope of this Article, two observations 
are in order.  The first is that Adam Smith was writing at a time when 
capital was not mobile as it is today.74  Daly and Cobb write: 
Consider . . . how the system is supposed to work. When enhanced productivity displaces workers in one area, the profits generated thereby are invested in something else.  New jobs are created. The workers move to this new industry.  The economy as a whole advances. But when investment capital becomes supranational, there is no assurance that the new investment will be in the country where the jobs are lost.  Indeed, acting on individualistic economic principles unencumbered by community, investors seek the best return on their money.  A factory employing docile and cheap labor that can export its products to the American market from abroad will be more profitable than one built in the United States.  Labor-intensive industry will naturally move to countries where labor is cheaper. Wages will decline in countries where capital investment is reduced.75 
Thus, the invisible hand does not work from a national perspective if 
 
 71. DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 3 (Economic Fairness and Well-Being) (quoting Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 889–90) (emphasis added).  72. Id. at ch 6 (Cooperation, Trust and the Law) (quoting Robert M. Axelrod & Geoffrey M. Hodgson, The Evolution of Cooperation, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO INSTITUTIONAL AND EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 80–84 (Geoffrey M. Hodgson et al. eds., 1994)).  73. Id. at ch. 11 (Globalization: A Revisionist Approach) (quoting HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD: REDIRECTING THE ECONOMY TOWARD COMMUNITY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 209–23, 226–27 (2d ed. 1994)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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capital is mobile.  Actually, Adam Smith understood this fact.76 
The second observation is of the collective action problem presented 
by Daly and Cobb.  They explain: 
Consider . . . a U.S. Firm that moves its production across the Rio Grande into Mexico.  It lays off U.S. workers earning 10 to 12 dollars per hour and hires Mexican workers at less than two dollars per hour.  The U.S. capitalist-owner is much better off, the Mexican workers are slightly better off, and the U.S. worker is much worse off. . . .  [The U.S. firm acting in its individual self-interest] wants to buy labor in the low-income country, and sell its product in the high-income country.  It wants to take advantage of high incomes in the U.S. product market while failing to contribute to the maintenance of that high-income market by buying labor in the U.S. factors markets.77 
While it is in the collective interest then of such firms to maintain a rich 
consumers market in the United States, it is not in their individual 
interest to do so.  Again, the invisible hand of Adam Smith fails to deal 
the cards predicted. 
G.  Two Further Examples 
Consider two further illustrations contrasting law and socioeconomics 
and law and neoclassical economics, one in legal scholarship and one in 
teaching.  Concerning legal scholarship, I recently completed an article 
on corporate ethical climates.78  I believe that a law and neoclassical 
economic scholar exploring this subject would focus mainly on incentives 
that would encourage a person to act ethically, such as monitoring 
systems and punishments for unethical conduct.  In contrast, from a law 
and socioeconomic perspective, I also focused on factors that would 
encourage employees to internalize ethical values, such as the organization’s 
values, its decisionmaking procedures, certain compensation systems, 
and organizational leadership. 
An illustration of different approaches to teaching involves the Baby 
M case,79 which I cover in my law and socioeconomics seminar.  In that 
case the surrogate mother did not want to give the child to the natural 
father and his wife.  A student after class told me that her contracts class 
had discussed the Baby M case, and the conclusion was that the contract 
should be enforced because, after all, the parties were adults, and the 
procedure was initiated by the father, who intended to care for the child 
after birth.  However, unlike the contracts class, I assigned contextual 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  78. Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations 
and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s 
Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2003).  79. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
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material to students.  This material contained information on the surrogacy 
industry and motivations of surrogate mothers. 
According to Anderson, women who are motivated purely by money 
are often rejected by the surrogacy industry.80  It selects women based on 
traits of submissiveness and emphasizes motives of generosity and love 
in giving a baby to a childless couple.81  The industry stresses the surrogate 
mother’s altruistic motives should she object to contract terms.82 
Many women become surrogate mothers believing that surrogacy will 
fulfill some emotional need, which is unlikely to happen.83  For example, 
many of them wish to feel special and appreciated and desire emotional 
support and personal connections.84  Of course, most adoptive parents 
want the baby and to have nothing to do with the birth mother.85 
After separating from the baby, most surrogate mothers have 
emotional issues, some quite serious.86  The women have no idea in 
advance of the psychological attachment that they may develop to the 
child, although this is well known in the surrogacy industry.  While this 
emotional fallout is predictable, these contracts do not contain provisions 
for therapy for the surrogate mother after separating from the child, but 
often contain provisions that require the surrogate mother to do “emotional 
labor” in suppressing the development of feelings of parental love.87 
The industry refers to these mothers as “hatcheries,” “plumbing,” 
“rented property,” or “surrogate uteruses.”88  This dehumanization 
obviously serves the purpose of making it easier for employees to deflect 
and belittle the expected emotions of these women. 
There are also societal issues involved in enforcing these contracts 
that concern the effects of commodifying babies and pricing them.  It 
may change norms and the ways parents view their children and children 
see themselves.89  Children are affected.  For example, children of some  
 
 80. DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 8 (The Domain of Markets) (citing ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 169–72, 174–81, 185–89 (1993)). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. (stating that motives also include punishing oneself for a prior abortion and coming to terms with emotions associated with losing another child in the past). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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surrogate mothers have expressed fears that they too will be sold and 
feel they have lost a brother or sister when the surrogate mother gives up 
the baby.90 
In addition, there is the issue of introducing the profit motive in such a 
sensitive area fraught with emotions.  The intermediary used in the Baby 
M case, for example, failed to disclose to the adoptive parents and the 
surrogate mother the results of the surrogate mother’s psychological test, 
which was part of the procedures agreed to.91  The psychologist reported 
that the surrogate mother, Ms. Whitehead, exhibited traits that indicated 
she would have a difficult time separating from the baby and that further 
testing should be done.92  No further testing was done.93  In fact, Ms. 
Whitehead could not separate from her baby and took the baby out of  
the state.94 
Finally, there are issues associated with having a production system 
for babies.  Will we see baby farms?  What if the market should dry 
up—should we have liquidation sales for babies?  Also, there is the issue 
of the slippery slope: why not have a market for older children as well? 
After considering these issues, the student was not so sure that 
surrogacy contracts should be enforced and appreciated the complexity 
of this public policy issue, which is not clearly reducible to a simple 
ideology connecting autonomy with enforcing contracts among adults. 
III.  THE SCOPE OF LAW AND SOCIOECONOMICS COURSES 
I present in this Part the subjects that I selected to include in my 
textbook on law and socioeconomics.  There are many other subjects that 
teachers may wish to pursue.  This discussion, however, is intended to give 
a good overview of what a course on law and socioeconomics may look like. 
A law and socioeconomics course might profitably begin with an 
introduction that compares law and socioeconomics with law and 
neoclassical economics in terms of perceptions of markets, economics as 
a discipline, assumptions concerning human behavior, methodologies, 
and legal analysis.95  These comparisons may provide a conceptual 
framework for the course that students can follow.  Introductory material 
may also include an institutional and behavioral critique of neoclassical 
“efficiency” concepts and present the Coase Theorem and an 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. (quoting In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 1 (Introduction to Law and Socioeconomics). 
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institutional and behavioral critique of it.96 
In my view, the course should include, early in the semester, material 
from the vast law and behavioral economics literature that challenges the 
rationality assumption of neoclassical economics.97  This material will 
permit students to consider the relevance to law that humans are 
boundedly rational, use heuristics, and are prone to systematic biases in 
their decisionmaking. 
I also believe that the course should give attention to distributive 
fairness concepts as well as human well-being paradigms and their 
relevance to the law.98  Students may explore the relevance of economic 
fairness to legal and business decisionmaking and the relationships 
between social and economic rights and well-being paradigms.99 
In addition, the course may consider factors that lead to perceptions of 
the legitimacy of legal authority and compliance with the law.  This 
discussion may refer to materials on procedural fairness and on 
socialization and internalization processes as suggested by social 
learning and moral development theories.100  Students may particularly 
find of interest materials on the impact of legal education on moral 
orientation and on the relationship between moral orientation and 
judicial decisionmaking.101 
Flowing logically from the consideration of internalization processes, 
a course may address the nature of norms and the reasons they are 
followed.102  Students may also consider the interrelationships between 
law and norms, and explore questions such as the following: Should 
judicial decisionmaking take into account norms?  What role should 
custom play in legal decisionmaking?  Is there an expressive function of 
laws?  Do laws change norms, and if so, should legal regulation be 
designed to serve this function?103 
A law and socioeconomics course may also profitably explore trust 
and cooperation because they are important to the law and economic 
life.104  Discussions may address the possible motivations and conditions 
 
 96. See id. at ch. 1 apps. A & B. 
 97. See id. at ch. 2 (Law and Cognitive Psychology). 
 98. See id. at ch. 3 (Economic Fairness and Well-Being). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. at ch. 4 (Fairness and Legal Socialization). 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. at ch. 5 (Culture, Norms and the Law). 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. at ch. 6 (Cooperation, Trust and the Law). 
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for cooperation, the neoclassical and socioeconomic meanings of trust, 
and the relationship between altruism and selfishness and contract law 
and fiduciary duty law.105 
As discussed in more detail in Part IV of this Article, the course may 
also examine the subject of discrimination by considering the perspectives 
of alternative schools of economic thought and the findings of 
psychologists concerning stereotyping.106  Relevant issues that may be 
explored include whether the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should exist, the 
theories for including certain groups under the Act, and the advisability 
of affirmative action policies and programs.107  Students may also 
discuss whether the antidiscrimination laws have been successful in 
combating gender discrimination in the workplace by reference to 
materials on different perspectives and information on the gender wage 
gap, gender job segregation, and the glass ceiling.108 
A particularly relevant issue for a law and socioeconomics course is 
when markets should operate, or the appropriate domain of markets.  I 
discuss this issue by asking students whether markets should exist for 
babies and the services of surrogate mothers.109  Students are able to 
explore the likely consequences of having such markets.  In addition, 
they may address questions such as whether the essence of the 
relationships between mothers and children are captured when law and 
neoclassical economists use market terminology to describe these 
relationships and whether the use of market rhetoric has the fearful 
potential of changing the very nature of the relationships themselves. 
I recommend that courses discuss families, markets, and the law 
because students view these subjects as particularly relevant to their 
lives.110  I begin with an exploration of historical perspectives on gender 
roles as markets and social norms have changed.111  I also include 
materials on the sources of power (including economic power) and 
manifestations of power within marital relations.112  Students may 
consider the following issues: How have laws and legal decisions 
affected conceptions (or images) of women, and in addition, in what 
ways have conceptions (or images) of women held by society at large 
affected the law and legal decisions?113  Moreover, how have 
 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. at ch. 7 (Discrimination). 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. at chs. 7 (Discrimination), 9 (Families, Markets and the Law). 
 109. See id. at ch. 8 (The Domain of Markets: Markets for Babies and Surrogate Mothers?). 
 110. See id. at ch. 9 (Families, Markets and the Law). 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. 
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perceptions of gender roles, images of women, and sexual mores and 
practices changed national family policies, family law (divorce and child 
custody law), and welfare law, and what are the economic and social 
consequences of these changes?114 
A law and socioeconomics course may also address whether the 
workplace has accommodated families with two working parents and 
single parents.115  Students may relate to this subject by considering 
workplace changes that law firms have made.116  An important issue 
raised is whether workplace practices are geared to the nature of the 
work or are culturally determined, namely, based on a historical conception 
of the full-time, ideal male worker with few home responsibilities.  
Other relevant issues include the following: Are women and men 
downshifting to accommodate children and more balanced lives?  Are 
mothers and fathers working longer hours?  Do they have time for their 
children?  What are the values and practicalities facing fathers and 
mothers at this point in history concerning competitive consumerism, 
careerism, and living balanced lives?117 
Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues arise 
when families are considered.  In this connection, a course may cover 
the perspectives of progressive corporate scholars on stakeholder theory 
and managerial accountability as they differ from those of conservative 
contractarians, who claim that the corporation’s management should act 
solely in the interests of shareholders.118  It may address the corporate 
social responsibility debate and explore issues concerning the limitations 
of legislation and markets to assure moral decisionmaking by 
managers.119  Of course, Enron is of particular interest.  In this regard, 
attention may be given to the corporate culture at Enron and the factors 
that contribute to an ethical corporate culture.120  In addition, a course 
may consider problems in regulating the conduct of multinational 
corporations by exploring the importance and limitations of international 
human rights norms, internal corporate codes of conduct, and the work of 
nongovernmental organizations in regulating the conduct of multinational 
corporations, and by considering different perspectives on whether and 
 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. at ch. 10 (Corporate Social Responsibility, Markets and the Law). 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. 
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how regulation may contribute to responsible corporate conduct.121 
A law and socioeconomics course may also include classes on 
globalization.122  The theory of comparative advantage and free market 
theory as applied to today’s global marketplace and the critique of this 
theory are relevant.123  Also important is a revisionist approach to 
globalization that examines who benefits and who loses from specific 
decisions to liberalize trade rather than assuming that all such decisions 
are positive.124  Students may profitably explore the consequences for 
legal regulation of a global marketplace and consider the impact of trade 
and capital liberalization on U.S. workers and others.125  Finally, in the 
context of the Asian financial crisis and the Tequila effect, students may 
consider the dangers of instability resulting from capital liberalization 
and the possible legal remedies that may diminish these dangers.126 
In classes on emerging market economies students may explore the 
philosophy behind the introduction of liberalized markets and 
privatization in such nations as Russia, Czechoslovakia, and China.127  
Subjects may include the shortcomings of the rapid introduction of 
liberalized markets, the social preconditions for effective markets, and 
the importance of pragmatism rather than free market ideology in 
economic and social transformation.128  This discussion is most 
instructive when it occurs in the context of comparing the neoclassical 
and evolutionary-institutional economic approaches to liberalized markets 
and privatization.129  In addition, teachers may wish to raise issues 
concerning the interrelationships in developing nations between democracy, 
ethnonationalism, and market capitalism.130 
From the above description of the potential scope of a law and 
socioeconomics course, it is obvious that there is not enough time in  
such a course to cover all of these issues.  This leaves the teacher 
considerable flexibility.  Teachers may wish to have students write 
papers on some of the issues not covered in class. 
There are also many subjects that a law and socioeconomics course 
might address that are not covered in my materials, such as immigration 
and the privatization of public utilities, prisons, and social security.  In 
my view, law and socioeconomic materials on additional subjects would 
 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. at ch. 11 (Globalization: A Revisionist Approach). 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. at ch. 12 (Emerging Market Economies). 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. 
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(1) compare neoclassical economic and heterodox economic 
perspectives, (2) address the implications to law and public policy of 
modifying neoclassical economic assumptions, such as the assumption 
of rationality, and (3) consider the perspectives and findings of other 
social science disciplines. 
IV.   THE APPROACH IN A SELECTED SUBJECT AREA 
In this Part, I describe the approach I take in exploring one subject 
area, which is discrimination.  This discussion is intended to give a more 
in-depth understanding of the teaching and materials used in a law and 
socioeconomics course.  I begin my classes on discrimination with a 
statistical comparison of white and black families concerning income, 
wealth, home ownership, and hours worked to capture the students’ 
attention.  I then explore with them various economic discrimination 
theories.  I start with Gary Becker’s associational preference theory, that 
is, his taste for discrimination theory and the general claim that markets 
can deal effectively with discrimination.131  I separate out Becker’s 
arguments concerning the economic consequences to minorities 
depending on whether the discriminatory tastes come from employers, 
coworkers, or consumers.  I also include material from Richard Epstein’s 
provocative book concerning the advantages of freedom of contract.132 
I then turn to the statistical discrimination theory, which relaxes the 
neoclassical assumption of perfect information and explains why some 
minority members may receive wages below their marginal productivity, 
which is referred to as economic discrimination.  The statistical 
discrimination theory suggests that discrimination by employers is 
rational and profit maximizing because it serves as an effective means to 
reduce the employers’ cost of acquiring information about individual 
employees.  The theory assumes that the discrimination is based on real 
differences in productivity among groups.  I include Epstein’s argument 
that antidiscrimination laws hurt minorities, because employers cannot 
offer them discriminatory wages to overcome the disadvantages that 
statistical group assessments create for them.  I further discuss the views 
of economists, historians, and philosophers that raise questions and 
provide information supporting and countering these arguments and 
 
 131. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 2–3 (1957).  132. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 3, 4, 9 (1992). 
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theories.  For example, I cover the competing views concerning the 
effect that statistical discrimination has on human capital investments by 
minorities, Richard McAdams’s status-production model of race 
discrimination,133 and arguments that discrimination will persist only if it 
is based on real differences in productivity among groups. 
I then turn to the perspectives of traditional institutional economists 
who consider discrimination based on race, gender, and the like as 
invidious distinctions and who view behavior as “mediated by cultural 
interpretations, habituated behaviors and prescriptive social norms.  
Institutionalists reject the neoclassical faith in market rationality, seeing 
economic processes as ordered by systems of cultural belief and practice 
that evolve historically.”134  This perspective presents the possibility that 
employment decisions may reflect and reproduce discriminatory social 
and cultural norms.  I then briefly consider the cultural and historical 
origins of stereotyping about minority groups and how the content of 
social categories are transmitted among society members.  I return to this 
subject of stereotyping later in the materials. 
Next, I include materials on the best known institutional theory, the 
dual labor market theory, which focuses on the importance of internal 
administrative structures.  I also present criticisms of this approach.  To 
make this material meaningful to law students, I draw on David Wilkins 
and Mitu Gulati’s excellent article, Why Are There So Few Black 
Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms?  An Institutional Analysis.135  In this 
article, the authors explain how high wages and partnership tournaments 
adversely affect market pressures on law firms to hire and promote black 
lawyers.136  They also discuss how lawyers are placed on dual tracks, 
on a “training” or a “flatlining” track, and how this process affects the 
opportunities and incentives of black lawyers.137  I also make passing 
references to other relevant labor market theories. 
I then consider the views of feminist economists, who take a number 
of different approaches.  Most feminist economists, however, contrary to 
Becker’s theory, and like institutionalists, treat discrimination as a 
systematic problem rather than a matter of individual “taste.”138  I also 
 
 133. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group 
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1044–45 (1995).  134. Ann L. Jennings, Economic Policies to Counter Discrimination, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO INSTITUTIONAL AND EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 161, 162 (Geoffrey M. Hodgson et al. eds., 1994).  135. David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in 
Corporate Law Firms?  An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493 (1996). 
 136. Id. at 519–20. 
 137. Id. at 539–41.  138. Ann Jennings, Theories of Labour Markets, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO FEMINIST ECONOMICS 511, 515–16 (Janice Peterson & Margaret Lewis eds., 1999). 
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introduce materials on gender theory that suggests that discrimination 
affects not only hiring and promotion, but the very definition of 
occupations and their values, thus shaping the division of labor as a 
whole.  I present information on gender job segregation, the wage gap, 
and the glass ceiling.  I explore the explanations that human capital 
theory offers for these phenomena and various criticisms and findings 
concerning these explanations. 
After discussing the glass ceiling, I give an overview of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1965,139 which is intended to outlaw employers’ 
expression of tastes for discrimination and statistical discrimination in 
employment decisions.  I set forth the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,140 in which Ann Hopkins sued Price 
Waterhouse for failing to promote her to partnership.141  The record 
reflected gender stereotyping—her mentor at Price Waterhouse told her 
she needed to wear make-up and jewelry and walk and dress more 
femininely.142  I also include Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 
Inc.,143 which provides some protection for homosexuals from 
discrimination resulting from their failure to meet gender stereotypes.144 
I follow this material with information on implicit or unconscious 
stereotyping from the psychological literature and draw on excellent law 
review articles by Charles Lawrence145 and Linda Krieger146 to present 
the psychoanalytic explanation for racism and the cognitive psychology 
approach to discrimination.  Concerning the latter approach, I include 
materials relevant to employment and promotion decisions that show 
how “[s]chemas serve essential heuristic functions in human 
cognition,”147 which can result in the biasing of incoming information 
and lead to predictable types of errors in social judgments.  The 
relevance of this psychological information is then explored in the 
context of the Price Waterhouse case, drawing on an article by Susan 
Fiske, a social psychologist, who testified in that case.148 
 
 139. 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000)).  140. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 141. Id. at 231–32. 
 142. Id. at 235.  143. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 144. See id. at 82.  145. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).  146. Krieger, supra note 46. 
 147. Id. at 1200.  148. See Susan T. Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping 
DALLAS .DOC 9/17/2019  2:46 PM 
 
32 
I then turn to the implications for the law of implicit or unconscious 
stereotyping.  Should plaintiffs have to prove the intent to discriminate 
in cases such as Price Waterhouse?  What should plaintiffs have to 
prove?  Subjects explored include the recommendation of David 
Oppenheimer concerning providing a cause of action for negligent 
discrimination,149 other measures suggested by social psychologists for combating implicit stereotyping, and  the possibility of affirmative 
action as a remedy.  The arguments for and against affirmative action are 
examined, including consideration of studies on stereotype threat.150  
The students are brought back to Wilkins and Gulati’s article to discuss 
affirmative action arguments in the context of law firms.151 
Next, I raise the legal issue concerning which groups or classes of persons 
should be covered by Title VII.  Should homosexuals be included?  How 
about ugly or overweight persons?  Evidence shows a negative correlation 
between wages and obesity.  What is the significance to this issue of the 
halo effect, in which physical attractiveness is often considered to be 
associated with other positive characteristics?152  I question whether the 
determination of these issues is assisted by the rationales for determining 
suspect classifications under the Fourteenth Amendment.153 
In addition, I include material on the exception to Title VII, which 
permits certain forms of discrimination on the basis of “bona fide” 
occupational requirements.154  I ask the class the following question: 
What is the appropriate role of consumer preferences in establishing a 
bona fide occupational qualification, and does the standard applied by 
courts in determining whether a bona fide occupational requirement 
exists permit the perpetuation of societal stereotyping?  Lastly, materials 
are included that attempt to assess whether the antidiscrimination laws 
have been effective. 
This Part has reflected the approach that I take in all the materials I 
use in my law and socioeconomics course and textbook.  I consider 
various schools of economic thought and the contributions of other 
social sciences to our understanding of socioeconomic decisionmaking, 
 
Research in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1049 (1991).  149. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 899 (1993).  150. See Claude M. Steele, Thin Ice: “Stereotype Threat” and Black College 
Students, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1999, at 44. 
 151. See generally Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 135.  152. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: 
Attitudes, Self-Esteem and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCH. REV. 4, 9 (1995).  153. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).  154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000). 
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and explore the relevance of this material to various legal issues.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Law and socioeconomics courses expose students to alternative schools 
of economic thought and other social science materials that are relevant to 
law and public policy issues.  In addition, through comparisons of 
neoclassical and heterodox economic approaches, a law and socioeconomics 
course provides students with a framework for identifying different 
perspectives concerning the role of law, the role of economics in legal 
decisionmaking, and methods for designing and evaluating laws and 
public policies.  I hope that the approach I take will catch on and that it 
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